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COHEN V. LORD, DAY & LOR. A PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT'S
IMPERMISSIBLE RESTRICTION ON THE PRACTICE OF LAW
After several years as partner at law firm ABC, X decides to
switch to another firm in the same city. Upon leaving the firm, X
requests the compensation he earned but has not yet collected,
and is denied. Law firm ABC points to the partnership agreement
X signed which states that an attorney's unpaid compensation is
forfeited in the event that attorney leaves without consent to join
a competing firm. Is X bound by the partnership agreement's for-
feiture clause? A divided New York Court of Appeals recently
held that such a provision is in violation of the New York Code of
Professional Responsibility, Disciplinary Rule 2-108(A) as an im-
permissible restriction on the practice of law.
I. COVENANTS NOT TO COMPETE
Freedom of contract is a right guaranteed by the Constitution'
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. "No State shall . . . pass any ... Law impairing the
Obligation of Contracts .... " Id. The contract clause by its terms applies only to the
states, but a similar rule has been held applicable to the federal government by the fifth
amendment's due process clause. See Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 579 (1934)
(contracts between government and private individuals are considered "property" within
meaning of fifth amendment and rights arising out of contract are protected under Consti-
tution); Armstrong v. Fairmont Community Hosp. Ass'n, 659 F. Supp. 1524, 1533 (D.
Minn. 1987) (Contract "clause does not apply to the federal government. However, a fla-
grant impairment of contract by a federal governmental body would be forbidden by due
rocess clause of the fifth amendment .... "). Cf. Federal Land Bank of Wichita v. Story,
56 P.2d 588, 590 (Okla. 1988) (meaning of contract clause has been extended beyond its
original purpose of preventing states from passing debtor relief laws).
The purpose of the contract clause is to regulate agreements to which a state govern-
ment is a party, as well as agreements between private parties, so as to encourage "confi-
dence in the stability of contractual obligations." See United States Trust Co. v. New
Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 15-17 (1977) (quoting Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S.
398, 427-28 (1934)). State economic legislation affecting private contracts may be subject
to contract clause attack in certain circumstances. See Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Span-
naus, 438 U.S. 234, 248-51 (1978) (Minnesota law unconstitutionally impaired private com-
pany's contractual obligations to its employees under pension plan). But see El Paso v. Sim-
mons, 379 U.S. 497, 516-17 (1965) (contract clause does not prohibit certain state remedial
legislation affecting land titles).
The contract clause is limited by the police power of the states. See Spannaus, 438 U.S. at
241 (discussing state power to interfere with existing contractual obligations if public good
is served); United States Trust Co., 431 U.S. at 25 ("an impairment may be constitutional if it
is reasonable and necessary to serve an important public purpose"). See also Clarke, The
Contract Clause: A Basis for Limited Judicial Review of State Economic Regulation, 39 U. MIAMI
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that enables parties to create and assent to terms of their own
choosing without judicial interference." Nevertheless, certain con-
tractual provisions are held unenforceable because of overriding
societal interests.3 One such interest that courts have long recog-
L. REV. 183, 187 (1985) ("contract clause promotes a specific and beneficial national policy
and ... can be applied in a way that furthers that policy without unduly interfering with
state attempts to deal with changing economic problems"). For an overview of the con-
tracts clause, see generally H. HUNTER, MODERN LAW OF CONTRACTS ch. 25 (1986) (discus-
sion of contract law as essential part of individual freedom in capitalistic economy); R. Ro-
TUNDA, J. NOWAK & J. YOUNG, TREATISE ON CONSTrUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND
PROCEDURE § 11.8 (1986) (general discussion of contract clause); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CON-
STITUTIONAL LAW §§ 8.1-10.1 (1978) (general discussion of contractual liberties and impair-
ments); Hale, The Supreme Court and the Contract Clause, 57 HARV. L. REV. 512, 512-18
(1944) (scope and limitations of contract clause); Sterk, The Continuity of Legislatures: Of
Contracts and the Contract Clause, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 647 (1988) (examines contract clause
jurisprudence and cases for study of theories of legislative continuity).
' See Twin City Pipe Line Co. v. Harding Glass Co., 283 U.S. 353, 356 (1931) (citing
Printing & Numerical Registering Co. v. Sampson, L.R. 19 Eq. 462, 465 (1875)) ("The
general rule is that competent persons shall have the utmost liberty of contracting and that
their agreements voluntarily and fairly made shall be held valid and enforced in the
courts."); NLRB v. Nash-Finch Co., 211 F.2d 622, 626 (8th Cir. 1954) (noting Supreme
Court's approval, court relied on Sampson language); Printing & Numerical Registering Co.
v. Sampson, L.R. 19 Eq. 462 (1875). Traditional freedom of contract principles were stated
by Master of the Rolls Jessel as follows:
It must not be forgotten that you are not to extend arbitrarily these rules which say
that a given contract is void as being against public policy, because if there is one
thing which more than another public policy requires it is that men of full age and
competent understanding shall have the utmost liberty of contracting, and that their
contracts when entered into freely and voluntarily shall be held sacred and shall be
enforced by courts of justice.
Id. at 465. See also D. CALAMARI & J. PER.LLo, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS §§ 1-4 (3d ed. 1987).
Different theories on foundation of contract law and courts' strong commitment to uphold-
ing freedom to contract include "a) sovereignty of the human will b) the sanctity of prom-
ise c) private autonomy d) reliance e) needs of trade." Id. However, the modern day trend
is inconsistent with unrestricted freedom of contract. Id. at §§ 1-3. Contracts are burdened
with numerous legislative restrictions, especially in employment contracts and insurance
contracts. Id.; E. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 5.1, at 325 (1982) (courts have approved prin-
ciple that contracts made voluntarily and between competent persons should be firmly
upheld).
' See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178 (1979). Section 178 provides in perti-
nent part that "a promise or other term of an agreement is unenforceable on grounds of
public policy if legislation provides that it is unenforceable or the interest in its enforce-
ment is clearly outweighed in the circumstances by a public policy against the enforcement
of such terms." Id. There are many kinds of illegal contracts, ranging from those which are
explicitly barred by statute to those which are rendered illegal by judicial decisions because
they violate public policy. See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988) (contracts restraining commerce prohib-
ited); 15 U.S.C. § 8 (1988) (contracts intended to restrain trade and free competition, or
increase market price in United States prohibited). See also Town of Newton v. Rumery,
480 U.S. 386, 392 (1987) (release-dismissal agreements not sufficient threat to public inter-
est to justify per se unenforceable rule). The Court stated "a promise is unenforceable if
the interest in its enforcement is outweighed in the circumstances by a public policy
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nized is the public policy against restricting a person's livelihood."
A. Reasonableness Standard
Traditionally, courts view covenants not to compete as suspect
and will not enforce them unless they are shown to impose reason-
harmed by enforcement of the agreement." Id.; California Pac. Bank v. Small Business
Admin., 557 F.2d 218, 224 (9th Cir. 1977) (adopted Restatement position that illegal con-
tracts are unenforceable only when statute expressly provides for voidness or where any
interest in contract's enforcement is outweighed by public policy); Cotton States Mut. Ins.
Co. v. Neese, 254 Ga. 335, 338, 329 S.E.2d 136, 138 (1985) (insurer's contract provision
excluding accident coverage where insured attempted to avoid apprehension or arrest un-
enforceable as matter of public policy); Beehive Medical Elecs., Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n,
583 P.2d 53, 61 (Utah 1978) ("impairment of obligation" provision of Constitution does
not "establish a right of parties to make contracts which are illegal or against public
policy").
New York law provides for automatic partnership dissolution upon the withdrawal of any
partner. See N.Y. PARTNERSHIP LAW § 60 (McKinney 1988); Matter of Vann v. Kreindler,
Relkin & Goldberg, 54 N.Y.2d 936, 937, 429 N.E.2d 817, 818, 445 N.Y.S.2d 139, 139
(1981) (partnership dissolved pursuant to § 60 of N.Y. Partnership Law). In an effort to
avoid this result, Lord, Day & Lord provided for the partnership's continuation and the
foregoing of formal accounting to the withdrawing partner pursuant to N.Y. Partnership
Law § 69. See Cohen v. Lord, Day & Lord, 75 N.Y.2d 95, 101, 550 N.E.2d 410, 413, 551
N.Y.S.2d 157, 160 (1989). The problem in Cohen was that the partnership agreement went
too far when it provided for an informal accounting to the withdrawing partner consisting
of "only his withdrawable credit balance on the books of the partnership at the date of his
withdrawal, together with the amount of his capital account .... " Id. at 103, 550 N.E.2d
at 414, 551 N.Y.S.2d at 161 (quoting from Lord, Day & Lord partnership agreement). A
withdrawing partner's right to payment for his portion of the firm's net profits was for-
feited under the agreement. Id. The language of the agreement, in the context of Cohen,
clashed with public policy embodied in DR 2-108(A) and subjected the forfeiture clause to
judicial invalidation. Id. at 96, 550 N.E.2d at 410, 551 N.Y.S. 2d at 157.
4 See Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 287 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("a contract
which forbids anyone to practice his calling is commonly called an unreasonable restraint
of trade"); Rao v. Rao, 718 F.2d 219, 223 (7th Cir. 1983) (noncompetition covenants con-
sidered initially suspect because they impair availability of service and interfere with com-
petition); Eaton Corp. v. Appliance Valves Corp., 526 F. Supp. 1172, 1182 (N.D. Ind.
1981) ("any restrictions on an employee's liberty of action in his business or trade are not
favored by the law"); Purchasing Ass'n v. Weitz, 13 N.Y.2d 267, 272, 196 N.E.2d 245,
247, 246 N.Y.S.2d 600, 604 (1963) (strong public policy "militates against sanctioning the
loss of a man's livelihood"); see also Closius & Schaffer, Involuntary Nonservitude: The Current
Judicial Enforcement of Employee Covenants Not to Compete - A Proposal For Reform, 57 S. CAL.
L. REv. 531, 540 (1984) (covenants not to compete "place a heavy burden upon the ability
of agents to pursue their careers or practice their skills"). See generally RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF CONTRACTS at §§ 186-188 (1979) (discussing noncompetition clauses as restraints of
trade); 6A CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1379 (1962 & Supp. 1989) (benefits of competition); Knif-
fen, Employee Non-competition Covenants: The Perils of Performing Unique Services, 10 RUT.-
CAM. L.J. 25 (1978) (discussing whether uniqueness of employee's services should be factor
in enforcing noncompetition clauses); Note, Post Employment Restraints: An Analysis of Theo-
ries of Enforcement, and a Suggested Supplement to the Covenant Not to Compete, 17 TUtsA L.J.
155 (1981) (approaches to broad covenants not to compete).
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able restrictions under the circumstances." In general, courts ap-
ply a reasonableness test that balances the parties' interests to de-
termine whether particular covenants not to compete are
permissible.6 Upon finding such a covenant impermissible, a court
may invalidate the contract in whole or in part.7 The reasonable-
5 See Muma v. Financial Guardian Inc., 551 F. Supp. 119, 123 (E.D. Mich. 1982) (re-
straints on insurance agents are not reasonable, therefore not permitted); Carlo C. Gelardi
Corp. v. Miller Brewing Co., 502 F. Supp. 637, 653 (D.N.J. 1980) (contract creating unrea-
sonable restraint of trade not enforced). But see Cullman Broadcasting Co. v. Bosley, 373
So. 2d 830, 835-37 (Ala. 1979) (covenant restraining radio announcer from accepting em-
ployment with other stations found reasonable and enforceable); Thompson v. Turner,
245 N.C. 478, 481, 96 S.E.2d 263, 266-67 (1957) (business seller's promise not to open
new business within "territory now covered" found reasonable and sufficiently definite for
enforcement). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 186 (1979) ("whether a re-
straint is reasonable [and thus enforced] is determined in light of the circumstances of the
transaction"); 6A CORBIN, CONTRACTS §§ 1379-1384 (1962 & Supp. 1989) (discussing disap-
proval of covenants not to compete); Closius & Schaffer, supra note 4, at 539-40 ("re-
straints of trade" not favored by courts); Krendl & Krendl, Non Competition Covenants in
Colorado: A Statutory Solution?, 52 DEN. L.J. 499, 499 (1975) (noncompetition covenants gen-
erally suspect).
Since the American economy is based on free competition, covenants not to compete are
carefully scrutinized. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 186 (1979) (covenants
unenforceable if found to be "unreasonably detrimental to the smooth operation of a
freely competitive private economy"); Closius & Schaffer, supra note 4, at 541 (courts must
take into consideration employee's interest (right to job mobility) and employer's interest
(need to protect trade secrets, confidential information and good will)). Cf. McCarthy, The
Enforcement of Restrictive Covenants in France and Belgium: Judicial Discretion and Urban Plan-
ning, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1973) (comparison of restrictive covenants in France, Belgium
and United States).
o See Middlesex Neurological Ass'n v. Cohen, 3 Mass. App. 126, 132, 324 N.E.2d 911,
915 (1975) (two year noncompetition agreement between doctors upheld after balancing
interests); Gelder Medical Group v. Webber, 41 N.Y.2d 680, 683, 363 N.E.2d 573, 576,
394 N.Y.S.2d 867, 870 (1977) (if noncompetition covenants are "reasonable as to time and
area, necessary to protect legitimate interests, not harmful to the public and not unduly burden-
some, they will be enforced") (emphasis added); Kalish, Covenants Not to Compete and the
Legal Profession, 29 ST. Louis U.L.J. 423, 425 (1985) ("most ... agree that the test is essen-
tially a balancing test" which takes into account public interests, employer's interests and
restricted party's interests).
" See Welcome Wagon, Inc. v. Morris, 224 F.2d 693, 701 (4th Cir. 1955) (restrictive
covenants not severable and "must be judged as a whole and must stand or fall when so
judged"); Rector-Phillips-Morse, Inc. v. Vroman, 253 Ark. 750, 753, 489 S.W.2d 1, 4
(1973) (court refused to enforce covenant because of unreasonable duration and "refused
to engage in rewriting of contracts"); Insurance Center v. Taylor, 94 Idaho 896, 902, 499
P.2d 1252, 1256 (1972) (while recognizing propriety of modifying certain restrictive cove-
nants, court invalidated entire covenant as matter of law); Fox-Morris Ass'n v. Conroy, 460
Pa. 290, 295, 333 A.2d 732, 735 (1975) ("we have repeatedly held that a court of equity
may grant enforcement limited to those portions of the restrictions which are reasonably
necessary for the protection of the employer").
Some courts limit the overbroad covenant in order to make it reasonable, rather than
striking it down completely. See, e.g., Eastern Distrib. Co. v. Flynn, 222 Kan. 666, 679, 567
P.2d 1371, 1379 (1977) (court's reduction of geographical restriction rendered covenant
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ness of a restriction is evaluated in terms of its geographic area,
duration, and the activity it prohibits.8
B. Per Se Standard
Due to the legal profession's unique role in serving the public,9
covenants not to compete among lawyers are treated differently
than those in ordinary employment relationships.10 In determin-
reasonable); Hodges v. Todd, 698 S.W.2d 317, 320 (Ky. Ct. App. 1985) (noncompetition
covenant enforceable because trial court supplied missing reasonable geographic limita-
tions); Bess v. Bothman, 257 N.W.2d 791, 794 (Minn. 1977) (trial court properly added
geographic and time limit to covenant and enforced it as such); Solari Indus. v. Malady, 55
N.J. 571, 574, 264 A.2d 53, 61 (1970) (court rejects "void per se rule" and allows for
"partial enforcement of non-competition agreements"); Karplinski v. Ingrasci, 28 N.Y.2d
45, 45, 268 N.E.2d 751, 753, 320 N.Y.S.2d 1, 8 (1971) (with covenant silent as to essential
terms, court upheld geographic area as not unduly large, but limited restriction to practice
of oral surgery rather than dentistry in general, and supplied reasonable duration).
% See Bess, 257 N.W.2d at 794 (trial court properly supplied geographic and durational
terms to render covenant enforceable); Webber, 41 N.Y.2d at 685, 363 N.E.2d at 577, 394
N.Y.S.2d at 871 (court enforced in its entirety physician's covenant not to compete within
30 miles for five years); Karplinski, 28 N.Y.2d at 45, 268 N.E.2d at 753, 320 N.Y.S.2d at 8
(geographic area reasonable, but court supplied limited restriction to practice of oral sur-
gery rather than dentistry in general). See generally Blake, Employee Agreements Not to Com-
pete, 73 HARV. L. REV. 625 (1960) (discussion of reasonableness standard for noncompeti-
tion covenants).
' See C. WOLFRAM, MODERN LxA. ETHics 20 (1986) ("[L]awyers ... are uniquely quali-
fied to bring their specialized knowledge to bear in diagnosing professional problems ...
."). But see Kalish, supra note 6, at 438 ("the law business is no different than many other
service businesses").
10 See Gray v. Martin, 63 Or. App. 173, 180, 663 P.2d 1285, 1290 (1983) (DR 2-108(A)
imposes complete prohibition against attorney entering noncompetition agreement if attor-
ney intends to remain in practice).
Before the 1960's, courts did not distinguish lawyers' noncompetition covenants from
other covenants. See Hicklin v. O'Brien, 11 Ill. App. 2d 541, 546, 138 N.E.2d 47, 52
(1956) (court enforced reasonable covenant not to compete with sale of law practice and
rejected legal ethics argument); Toulmin v. Becker, 69 Ohio App. 109, 113, 124 N.E.2d
778, 784-85 (1954) (court used reasonableness test to determine if noncompetition cove-
nant between law firm and patent clerk was enforceable).
A new approach to attorneys' noncompetition covenants began in 1961 when the Ameri-
can Bar Association concluded that it is unethical for an attorney to include a restrictive
covenant as part of an employment contract. See ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, For-
mal Op. 300 (1961).
The special treatment given to attorney noncompetition covenants has caused some de-
bate. See generally Kalish, supra note 6, at 450-57 (discussing reasons for not applying rea-
sonableness test to lawyer noncompetition covenants); Note, Attorneys-Professional Responsi-
bility-Restrictive Covenants-Attorneys Must Not Enter Into Partnership Agreements Prohibiting
Themselves From Representing Former Clients Upon Termination of the Partnership, 4 Fordham
Urb. L.J. 195 (1975) [hereinafter Note, Attorneys] (advocating use of reasonableness stan-
dard for attorneys); Note, Competing Policies in Covenants Not to Compete, 53 Mo. L. REV. 589
(1988) [hereinafter Note, Competing Policies] (discussing freedom to contract).
380
Survey of Professional Responsibility
ing the enforceability of covenants not to compete within the legal
profession, courts apply a rule that invalidates such provisions as
violative of the Code of Professional Responsibility1 or public
policy, without regard to reasonableness.1" As members of the le-
gal profession, lawyers are held to ethical standards' s and thus
their restrictive covenants should be judged by ethical, rather
than commercial standards. 4
II. ETHICAL BOUNDARIES
New York follows the ABA Model Code of Professional Re-
" See Corlett, Killian, Hardeman, McIntosh & Levi v. Merritt, 478 So. 2d 828, 833 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (lawyers practicing as professional corporation governed by ethical
standards contained in Code of Professional Responsibility); Gray, 63 Or. App. at 180, 663
P.2d at 1290 (covenant violated DR 2-108(A) and was therefore unenforceable); Hagen v.
O'Connell, Goyak & Ball, P.C., 68 Or. App. 700, 701, 683 P.2d 563, 565 (1984) ("The
disciplinary rule is designed to govern the relationship between attorneys for the protec-
tion of the public and is a flat prohibition against an attorney entering a noncompetition
agreement if the attorney intends to remain in practice."); In re Silverberg, 75 App. Div.
2d 817, 819, 427 N.Y.S.2d 480, 482 (2d Dep't 1980) (since agreement violated Code of
Professional Responsibility, it was void as against public policy and inconsistent with profes-
sional status of attorneys).
11 See Dwyer v. Jung, 133 N.J. Super. 343, 345, 336 A.2d 498, 500 (1975) ("strong pub-
lic policy considerations preclude [reasonableness test's] applicability"). See also Mailman,
Ross, Toyes & Shapiro v. Edelson, 183 N.J. Super. 434, 435, 444 A.2d 75, 77-78 (1982)
(reasonableness test applicable to accountants even though client relationship similar to at-
torneys); Karlin v. Weinberg, 148 N.J. Super. 243, 244, 372 A.2d 616, 618 (1977) (court
refused to extend per se rule to medical profession). See generally Kalish, supra note 6, at
425-26 (1985) (examining difference in courts' treatment of attorney noncompetition cove-
nants); Note, Attorneys, supra note 10, at 200-02 (discussing progression leading up to revi-
sion of ethical standards in 1969); ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility,
Informal Op. 1072 (1968) (committee emphatically stated per se approach applies to re-
strictive covenants between law partners).
"' See S&S Hotel Ventures Ltd. Partnership v. 777 S.H. Corp., 69 N.Y.2d 437, 443, 508
N.E.2d 647, 650, 515 N.Y.S.2d 735, 738 (1987) ("Code of Professional Responsibility es-
tablishes ethical standards that guide attorneys in their professional conduct, and its impor-
tance is not to be diminished or denigrated by indifference."); Friedman v. State, 24
N.Y.2d 528, 539, 249 N.E.2d 369, 381, 301 N.Y.S.2d 484, 494 (1969) (Canons of Ethics
set guidelines for attorneys and judges); C. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL Emics § 2.7 at 68-78
(1986) (discussion of ethics within legal profession). See generally MODEL CODE OF PROFES-
SIONAL RESPONSIBILrrY PREAMBLE (1980) ("Lawyers as guardians of the law, play a vital role
in the preservation of society. . . . A consequent obligation of lawyers is to maintain the
highest standards of ethical conduct.").
" See Dwyer v. Jung, 133 N.J. Super. 343, 345, 336 A.2d 498, 500-01 (1975) (DR 2-
108(A) was basis for court's refusing to apply common law commercial standards to attor-
ney restrictive covenants); H. DRINKER, LEGAL EmHics 190 (1953) (lawyers' obligations and
relations to other lawyers is "primarily what characterizes the practice of law as a profes-
sion as distinguished from a business"); Note, Attorneys, supra note 10, at 202-03 ("lawyer
restrictive covenants should be judged by 'ethical' rather than 'commerical' standards").
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sponsibility (Code), 5 which has been adopted with certain amend-
ments by the New York State Bar Association, and is enforced by
the appellate division."6 Compliance with the Code's disciplinary
rules is mandatory 17 and attorneys are subject to disciplinary ac-
tion for any violations.18 Disciplinary Rule 2-108(A) of the Code
provides:
Agreements Restricting the Practice of a Lawyer
(A) A lawyer shall not be a party to or participate in a part-
nership or employment agreement with another lawyer that
restricts the right of a lawyer to practice law after the termi-
nation of a relationship created by the agreement, except as a
condition of the payment of retirement benefits.1 9
The policies underlying DR 2-108(A) are two-fold: 1) to preserve
an attorney's right to job mobility and 2) to protect a client's right
to choose an attorney.
' ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1980).
1 N.Y.S.B.A. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (McKinney 1970); N.Y. CONST. art. 6,
§ 4(k) ("The appellate divisions of the supreme court shall have all the jurisdiction pos-
sessed by them . . . and such additional jurisdiction as may be prescribed by law .... ");
N.Y. JUD. LAW § 90 (1)(a), (2) (McKinney 1983) (providing appellate division with bar ad-
mission and removal power). See Cohen v. Lord, Day & Lord, 75 N.Y.2d 95, 105, 550
N.E.2d 410, 415, 551 N.Y.S.2d 157, 162 (1989) (Hancock, J., dissenting) (all four depart-
ments adopted DR 2-108(A)).
"7 See C. WOLFRAM, supra note 9, § 2.6.3, at 59. Disciplinary rules are "mandatory in
nature" and state the "minimum level" of conduct for attorneys. Id. (quoting MODEL CODE
OF PROFESSIONAL RESPoNsIBILIry (Preliminary Statement 1980)); Marks & Cathcart, Disci-
pline within the Legal Profession, ETHICS AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION 65 (M. Davis & F. Ellis-
ton 1986) (disciplinary rules are mandatory).
"S See Rapoport v. Berman, 49 App. Div. 2d 930, 931, 373 N.Y.S.2d 652, 655 (2d Dep't
1975) (if attorney "has violated ethical standards, has overstepped the bounds of propriety
or has violated any of the canons of ethics ... the matter should be referred to this court
to ascertain whether disciplinary action is warranted").
'9 MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-108(A) (1980).
" See Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Hyatt, 302 Md. 683, 684, 490 A.2d 1224, 1225
(1985) (clause in legal clinic's employment contracts prohibiting departing staff attorneys
from establishing other clinics or contacting former clients violated DR 2-108(A)); Hagen
v. O'Connell, Goyak & Ball, P.C., 68 Or. App. 700, 701, 683 P.2d 563, 565 (1984) (cove-
nant restricting client's choice of counsel void); Gray v. Martin, 63 Or. App. 173, 182, 663
P.2d 1285, 1290 (1983) (purpose of DR 2-108(A) is to "govern the relationships between
attorneys for the protection of the public"); see also ABA Comm. on Ethics and Profes-
sional Responsibility, Informal Op. 300 (1961); C. WOLFRAM, supra at note 9, § 16.2, at 885
("One limitation is ... the agreement may not contain a restrictive covenant limiting the
right of any partner to practice law.").
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A. New York's Per Se Approach in Cohen v. Lord, Day & Lord
In Cohen v. Lord, Day & Lord,"' the New York Court of Appeals
applied a per se standard to invalidate a noncompetition clause as
an impermissible restriction on the practice of law."' The plaintiff,
Richard G. Cohen, was a partner in the defendant law firm, Lord,
Day & Lord (LD&L) s for nearly twenty years, and served as head
of its tax department before leaving ' in 1985 to become a part-
ner in another New York City law firm, Winthrop, Stimson, Put-
nam and Roberts. 5 When Cohen requested his departure com-
pensation from LD&L, the firm refused to pay, relying on the
forfeiture-for-competition clause of the partnership agreement.2 6
Cohen sued for approximately $285,000 in earned but uncol-
lected profits.27 On LD&L's motion to dismiss and Cohen's cross-
motion for summary judgment, the trial court ruled that the
clause was unenforceable as violative of DR 2-108(A).' The Ap-
pellate Division, First Department, unanimously reversed and
stated that the clause was valid as a "financial disincentive" to
competition and did not seek to prevent plaintiff from practicing
law in New York or any other jurisdiction.2 9 The court of appeals
granted plaintiff leave to appeal the appellate division's order 0
and reversed, holding that the partnership agreement's forfeiture-
for-competition clause was unenforceable as against the public
75 N.Y.2d 95, 550 N.E.2d 410, 551 N.Y.S.2d 157 (1989).
" Cohen v. Lord, Day & Lord, 75 N.Y.2d 95, 96, 550 N.E.2d 410, 410, 551 N.Y.S.2d
157, 157 (1989). See also Dwyer v. Jung, 133 N.J. Super. at 345, 336 A.2d at 500-01 (court
refused to apply reasonableness standard, but instead held covenant per se void for public
policy reasons); Gray, 63 Or. App. at 180, 663 P.2d at 1290 (restrictive covenant per se
invalid because it violated DR 2-108(A)).
" Cohen v. Lord, Day & Lord, 144 App. Div. 2d 277, 277, 534 N.Y.S.2d 161, 161 (1st
Dep't 1988) (with subsequent Lord, Day & Lord merger, firm name became Lord Day
Lord & Barrett, Smith), rev'd, 75 N.Y.2d 95, 550 N.E.2d 410, 551 N.Y.S.2d 157 (1989).
Cohen, 75 N.Y.2d at 96, 550 N.E.2d at 410, 551 N.Y.S.2d at 157.
Cohen, 144 App. Div. 2d at 277, 534 N.Y.S.2d at 161.
26 Cohen, 75 N.Y.2d at 97, 550 N.E.2d at 410, 551 N.Y.S.2d at 157.
" Cohen, 144 App. Div. 2d at 278, 534 N.Y.S.2d at 162. Cohen had two causes of action:
one to recover approximately $285,000 representing his portion of uncollected firm earn-
ings, and another to recover $1,875 as reimbursement for pension fund contributions. Id.
at 279, 534 N.Y.S.2d at 162.
' Cohen, 75 N.Y.2d at 97, 550 N.E.2d at 411, 551 N.Y.S.2d at 158.
' Cohen, 144 App. Div. 2d at 279, 534 N.Y.S.2d at 163.
so Cohen v. Lord, Day & Lord, 74 N.Y.2d 605, 541 N.E.2d 427, 543 N.Y.S.2d 398
(1989).
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policy reflected in DR 2-108(A). 1
B. Three Approaches to Cohen Problem
The Cohen court reasoned that the provision in question "does
not expressly or completely prohibit a withdrawing partner from
engaging in the practice of law, [but] the significant monetary
penalty it exacts . ..constitutes an impermissible restriction on
the practice of law" and was therefore in violation of DR 2-
108(A).32 Judge Bellacosa's majority opinion approached the ap-
plication of DR 2-108(A) to Cohen's facts pragmatically and con-
cluded that such a significant financial forfeiture would "realisti-
cally discourage and foreclose" such a partner from serving clients
wanting representation. The majority noted that its holding was
tailored to Cohen's facts and should not be given a broader
interpretation. 4
Judge Hancock, in his dissent, stated that the majority's invali-
dation of the clause was an "unwarranted interference with the
right of members of a partnership to establish reasonable contrac-
tual terms covering the withdrawal of a partner. '3 5 According to
Judge Hancock, the provision was not a restrictive covenant 6
since it did not entirely prohibit the plaintiff from practicing law
since he could, and did, continue to practice law by acceding to
the financial penalty. Ultimately, Judge Hancock reasoned, the
majority's reliance on DR 2-108(A) and its public policy was mis-
" Cohen, 75 N.Y.2d at 98, 550 N.E.2d at 411, 551 N.Y.S.2d at 158.
" Id.; see also Gray v. Martin, 63 Or. App. 173, 180, 663 P.2d 1285, 1290 (1983) (provi-
sion effectively prohibiting legal practice within county).
" Cohen, 75 N.Y.2d at 98, 550 N.E.2d at 411, 551 N.Y.S.2d at 158; see Hagen v.
O'Connell, Goyak & Ball, P.C., 68 Or. App. 700, 701, 683 P.2d 563, 565 (1984) (financial
penalty was against "public policy of making legal counsel available, insofar as possible,
according to the wishes of a client").
" Cohen, 75 N.Y.2d at 102, 550 N.E.2d at 413, 551 N.Y.S,2d at 160.
" Id. at 102, 550 N.E.2d at 414, 551 N.Y.S.2d at 161 (Hancock, J., dissenting). Cf. Ka-
lish, supra note 6, at 456 (covenants not to compete "permit firms and persons to agree to
order their affairs in a particular way"); Note, Attorneys, supra note 10, at 208 ("Dwyer's
blanket rejection of all lawyer restrictive covenants may also have the effect of discouraging
partnerships between willing attorneys involving willing clients.").
8 See Cohen, 75 N.Y.2d at 106, 550 N.E.2d at 416, 551 N.Y.S.2d at 163 (Hancock, J.,
dissenting).
37 Id. at 110, 550 N.E.2d at 418, 551 N.Y.S.2d at 165 (Hancock, J., dissenting).
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guided.3 8 Chief Judge Wachtler concurred with Judge Hancock's
reasoning yet dissented separately, adding that while DR 2-108(A)
applied, 89 Cohen's facts fit within the "retirement benefits" excep-
tion to the rule.' 0
C. Analysis
It is submitted that the majority's opinion is both the most prac-
tical and professionally responsible approach. Disciplinary Rule 2-
108(A) expressly prohibits agreements that "restrict" attorneys
from practicing law." The majority's broad interpretation of "re-
strict" effectuates the policies underlying DR 2-108(A),' 2 primar-
ily to ensure the public an unencumbered choice of counsel. 43
Therefore, "restrict" should not be limited to a complete prohibi-
tion of practicing law, but rather should include the significant
financial forfeiture sought by Lord, Day & Lord in Cohen." The
majority's broad interpretation of "restrict" is further supported
by Canon 7 which provides: "Efforts, direct or indirect in anyway
to encroach upon the business of another lawyer, are unworthy of
those who should be brethren at the Bar.' 54 The majority rea-
soned that if financial penalties were not restraints within the
meaning of the rule, there would be no need to exempt the spe-
cific category when dealing with retirement benefits, an argument
that undermines Chief Judge Wachtler's dissent.'6 Chief Judge
Wachtler's approach is problematic in that it eliminates any dis-
" Id. at 110, 550 N.E.2d at 419, 551 N.Y.S.2d at 166 (Hancock, J., dissenting).
Id. at 111, 550 N.E.2d at 419, 551 N.Y.S.2d at 166 (Wachtler, C.J., dissenting).
40 Id. at 112, 550 N.E.2d at 419, 551 N.Y.S.2d at 166-67 (Wachtler, C.J., dissenting). Cf.
Gray v. Martin, 63 Or. App. 173, 180, 663 P.2d 1285, 1290 (1983) ("retirement" excep-
tion would have no meaning).
41 MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-108(A) (1980).
4' See Cohen, 75 N.Y.2d at 98, 550 N.E.2d at 411, 551 N.Y.S.2d at 158; Note, Attorneys,
supra note 10, at 207 (broad interpretation of DR 2-108(A) used in Dwyer).
48 See Cohen, 75 N.Y.2d at 98, 550 N.E.2d at 411, 551 N.Y.S.2d at 158; Kalish, supra
note 6, at 431 n. 46 (one rationale of Formal Opinion 300 is to protect clients' freedom to
choose attorneys).
" See Cohen, 75 N.Y.2d at 98, 550 N.E.2d at 411, 551 N.Y.S.2d at 158.
, See ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHics No. 7 (1908) (original Canon 7 forbade at-
torney from encroaching on business of another attorney).
" Cohen, 75 N.Y.2d at 100, 550 N.E.2d at 412, 551 N.Y.S.2d at 159. But see id. at 111,
550 N.E.2d at 419, 551 N.Y.S.2d at 166 (Watchler, C.J., dissenting) ("payment of retire-
ment benefits can be conditional on a restriction of the lawyer's right to practice law after
termination of the partnership relationship").
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tinction between a "retiring" attorney and a "withdrawing" attor-
ney.47 It is submitted that, in effect, any attorney who withdraws
from a firm would be "retiring."
Courts may rely on applicable statutes, caselaw, or public policy
as a means to decide issues before them. 48 It is submitted that the
lack of legislation and caselaw does not render the majority's use
of DR 2-108(A) as a basis for invalidating the forfeiture clause "an
unwarranted interference." Disciplinary Rule 2-108(A) is an illus-
tration of the public policy to protect a client's right to choose an
attorney.49 Lawyers are bound by this disciplinary rule and can
not be permitted to contract out of its obligations."0
CONCLUSION
In keeping with the spirit embodied in the New York Code of
Professional Responsibility Disciplinary Rule 2-108(A), the New
York Court of Appeals in Cohen v. Lord, Day & Lord correctly in-
validated the forfeiture-for-competition clause as an impermissible
restriction on the practice of law. Judge Bellacosa's majority opin-
ion aptly recognized that the clause conditioned a withdrawing
partner's compensation upon his refraining from the practice of
law, prior to retirement. This discouragement of a partner from
serving clients was so significant as to "restrict" the lawyer's prac-
tice and interfere with the client's choice of counsel which contra-
dicts the language of, and purpose behind DR 2-108(A). Although
the Cohen court expressly limited its holding to the facts before it,
practitioners should not ignore the strong message concerning the
"' Cohen, 75 N.Y.2d at 112, 550 N.E.2d at 419, 551 N.Y.S.2d at 166-67 (Wachtler, C.J.,
dissenting). Cf Gray v. Martin , 63 Or. App. at 173, 180, 663 P.2d 1285, 1290 (1983)
("[e]very termination of a relationship beween law partners would be a retirement, and
agreements restricting the right to practice would always be allowed").
48 See Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457 (1892) (decision based on
interpretation of statute); Cotton States Mut. Ins. Co. v. Neese, 254 Ga. 335, 338, 329
S.E.2d 136, 138 (1985) (provision unenforceable as a matter of public policy); Codling v.
Paglia, 32 N.Y.2d 330, 298 N.E.2d 622, 345 N.Y.S.2d 461 (1963) (decision based on prior
caselaw).
'9 See Hagen v. O'Connell, Goyak & Ball, P.C., 68 Or, App. 700, 701, 683 P.2d 563, 565
(1984) (interferes with attorney availability); Koehler v. Wales, 16 Wash. App. 304, 315,
556 P.2d 223, 236 (1976) ("clients are not merchandise"); Kalish, supra note 6, at 431 n.46
(freedom of client in choosing attorney).
" See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPoNSIBILrrY PREAMBLE (1980) ("disciplinary rules
are mandatory in nature").
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legal profession's ethical boundaries in drafting and enforcing
partnership agreements.
Christine Ardita
" . AND JUSTICE FOR ALL"? - THE BAR, THE INDIGENT AND
MANDATORY PRO BONO
" 'Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with con-
ditions' . . . . [A lawyer is] an officer of the court, and, like
the court itself, an instrument or agency to advance the ends
of justice .... He might be assigned as counsel for the needy,
in causes criminal or civil, serving without pay .... All this is
undisputed." 1
INTRODUCTION
Pro bono publico literally means "for the public good."' The his-
tory of pro bono work can be traced back to the Roman era.' The
United States pro bono tradition is deeply rooted in English com-
mon law." Proposals to make pro bono obligatory have raised is-
People ex rel. Karlin v. Culkin, 248 N.Y. 465, 470-71, 162 N.E. 487, 489 (1928) (em-
phasis added). See also O'Connor, Legal Education and Social Responsibility, 53 FORDHAM. L.
REV. 659, 661 (1985). "Implicit in all [pro bono programs] is the concept that lawyers have
moral and social responsibilities in such instances and that those responsibilities need to be
discharged by the Bar, willingly, and some would say, even unwillingly." Id.
BLACK's LAW DIC-rIONARY 1203 (6th ed. 1990).
Maguire, Poverty and Civil Litigation, 36 HARV. L. REV. 361, 385 (1923) (Roman bar
advocated legal service without recompense). See United States v. Dillon, 346 F.2d 633,
636 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 978 (1966). A lawyer is subject to certain obliga-
tions "imposed upon him by the ancient traditions of his profession and as an officer assist-
ing the courts in the administration of justice" which include legal services to the indigent.
Id. But see Cunningham v. Superior Court, 177 Cal. App. 3d 336, 343, 222 Cal. Rptr. 854,
858 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986). "A careful examination of the 'deeply rooted' and 'ancient tradi-
tion' reveals a custom far more honored in its breach than in its observance." Id.; Shapiro,
The Enigma of The Lawyer's Duty to Serve, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 735, 749 (1980) (claims reliance
on Roman history is misplaced).
4 Tudzin, Pro Bono Work. Should It Be Mandatory or Voluntary, 12 J. LEGAL PROF. 103, 119
(1987). "Historically lawyers were considered to be 'officers of the court.' The term was
used in England originally to express the view that special responsibilities and duties at-
